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STATEMEI\JT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Richard Meyers Caldwell timely appeals from the district court's order denying
his I.C.R. 35 motion. In its Judgment of Conviction, the district court imposed seven,
concurrently-running, unified sentences of twenty years, with three years fixed, upon
Mr. Caldwell for his two convictions of lewd conduct with a minor under sixteen and five
convictions of sexual abuse of a minor under sixteen. Mr. Caldwell argues the Idaho
Supreme Court denied him due process of law when it denied his motion requesting
that the record on appeal be augmented with various transcripts and exhibits which
were directly relied on by the district court and the State at Mr. Caldwell's sentencing
hearing.

Mr. Caldwell also argues that the district court applied the wrong legal

standard when it denied his request for the appointment of counsel to represent him on
his I.C.R. 35 motion.

Mr. Caldwell also argues that the district court abused its

discretion when the district court denied his I.C.R. 35 motion in light of the new
information he provided.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. Caldwell was indicted on three counts of lewd conduct with a minor under the
age of sixteen and five counts of sexual abuse of a minor under the age of sixteen. (R.,
pp.9-14.) He was acquitted of one count of lewd conduct with a minor under the age of
sixteen and convicted on the remaining counts. (R., pp.205-06, 228-36.) Thereafter,
the district court imposed seven, concurrently-running, unified sentences of twenty
years, with three years fixed, upon Mr. Caldwell for his various convictions. (R., pp.22836.)
1

Mr. Caldwell timely filed a prose I.C.R. 35 motion and requested the district court
appoint him counsel to represent him on that motion.

(R., pp.255-65, 269-72.) The

district court denied both requests. (R., pp.286-89.) Mr. Caldwell timely appealed. (R.,
pp.303-08.)
On appeal, 1\/lr. Caldwell's appellate counsel filed a motion to augment and
suspend the briefing schedule, wherein appellate counsel requested that the record on
appeal be augmented with a transcript of the jury trial, a transcript of the grand jury
proceedings, a transcript of a sentencing hearing which was held in his co-defendant's
proceedings, and various exhibits from the co-defendant's proceedings.

(Motion to

Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof,

(hereinafter "Motion to Augment"), pp.1-9.)

The Idaho Supreme Court denied

Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment. (Order Denying Motion to Augment and to Suspend
the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter "Order Denying Motion to Augment"), pp.1-2.)
Thereafter, appellate counsel filed a Renewed Motion to Augment and to Suspend the
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof, (hereinafter "Renewed Motion to
Augment), wherein appellate counsel narrowed the request for items. (Renewed Motion
to Augment, pp.1-16.)

2

ISSUES

1.

Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Caldwell due process and equal
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment the record with various
transcripts and exhibits, which were relied on by the district court at sentencing
and in its disposition of his I.C.R. 35 motion?

2.

Did the district court err when it determined that Mr. Caldwell's request for
counsel in regard to his Idaho Criminal Rule 35 motion was frivolous?

3.

Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Caldwell's Rule 35
Motion for a Reduction of Sentence in light of the financial and emotional
hardships caused by his sentence and the negative impact his sentence is
having on his mental health?

3

ARGUMENT

I.
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Caldwell Due Process And Equal Protection
Rights When It Denied Mr. Caldwell's Motion To Augment The Record With Various
Transcripts And Exhibits, Which Were Relied On By The District Court At Sentencing
And In Its Disposition Of His I.C.R. 35 Motion

A.

Introduction
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause to deny an
indigent defendant access to transcripts of trial proceedings which are relevant to issues
the defendant intends to raise on appeal. The only way a state can constitutionally
preclude an indigent defendant access to a requested transcript is if the State can prove
the transcript is irrelevant to the appeal.
The Idaho Supreme Court denied Mr. Caldwell's constitutional due process rights
because it cannot review his case on the merits where it does not have the evidence
considered by the district court. Thus, Mr. Caldwell lost the opportunity for a meaningful
hearing on the merits of his appeal when he was denied access to the requested items.
Additionally, Mr. Caldwell's due process right to a meaningful appeal includes a
right to counsel on direct appeal and effective assistance from that counsel. In order to
provide effective assistance of counsel, appellate counsel must have access to the
requested items to adequately analyze and brief the merits of the district court's
decision to deny his I.C.R. 35 motion. When state action prevented Mr. Caldwell from
obtaining the necessary transcripts and exhibits, he was denied the ability to have his
issues reviewed on the merits and thus denied his constitutional rights to due process.
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B.

The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Caldwell Due Process And Equal
Protection Rights When It Denied Mr. Caldwell's Motion To Augment The Record
With Various Transcripts And Exhibits, Which Were Relied On By The District
Court At Sentencing And In Its Disposition Of His I.C.R. 35 Motion

1.

Mr. Caldwell's Statutory Right To Appeal From The District Court's Order
Denying His I.C.R. 35 Motion Is Afforded State And Federal Constitutional
Due Process Protections

The constitutions of both United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. C0I\JST. amend. XIV; ID. CONST. art. I,

§ 13.
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965); Cole
v. Arkansas, 333 U.S. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair."
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24
(1981).

State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood,
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). Additionally, the Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United
States Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United
States Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State,

Dept. of Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221, 227 (1998) ( citing Smith
v. Idaho Dep't of Correction, 128 Idaho 768, 771 (1996)).
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. See I.C.

§ 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a transcript, the
cost of such transcript must be created at county expense.
I.C. § 19-863(a).

Idaho court rules also address this issue.

I.C. § 1-1105(2);

I.C.R. 5.2 mandates the

production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant.

I.C.R. 5.2(a).

Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court ..
5

.. " Id. I.C.R. 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to be prepared at
county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as provided by statute
or law." I.C.R. 54. 7(a).
An appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an appeal of right as defined in
Idaho Appellate Rule 11(9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 891 (Ct. App. 1983) (An
order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under I.C.R. 35 is an appealable order
pursuant to I.AR. 11(c)(6)).
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of opinions that directly
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can
require the state to pay for an appellate record, including verbatim transcripts of the
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these
cases.

The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal

protection clauses are interpreted broadly; any disparate treatment between indigent
defendants and those with financial means are not tolerated.

However, the second

theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for
review. The state does not have to provide an indigent defendant with everything he or
she requests. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal
protection, the state must prove the indigent defendant's request is entirely frivolous.
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
In that case, two indigent defendants were convicted of armed robbery and "filed a
motion in the trial court asking that a certified copy of the entire record, including a
stenographic transcript of the proceedings, be furnished them without cost." Griffin, at
13. At that time, the State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants
that had been sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to
6

purchase transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States
Supreme Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent nondeath penalty defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16.
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich,
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227,
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id.

The Supreme Court went on to hold as

follows:
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant.
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious
discriminations.

Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to meet the constitutional mandates
of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be provided with
a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At the same time,
the Supreme Court limited this ruling and does not require the states to provide a
stenographic transcript in instances where a less expensive yet adequate alternative
exists. Id. at 20.
7

In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency.

In

that case, the State argued the defendant had already received appellate review of his
conviction by the Ohio appellate court.

Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States

Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. "This principle is no less
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id.
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under
the present standard, ... , they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court expanded its holding in Griffin, that
a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is available, by
adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the stenographic
transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the appeal, and a
State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such circumstances." Id.
at 495.

The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for appeal by the

defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The Court ultimately
concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be adequately reviewed
without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial proceedings. Id. at 497-99.
8

Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove the requested
items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. This authority has been recognized by both
the Idaho Supreme Court and the Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91
Idaho 909 (1967); State v. Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten,
144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 2007).
The foregoing line of authority establishes the following principles:

First, the

Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause and equal protection clause both preclude
the States from discriminating against a defendant based upon the defendant's indigent
status. Second, there is no constitutional right to an appeal, but once a state creates a
statutory right to appeal, it cannot prevent an indigent defendant a meaningful appeal
based on the merits.

These are broad protections which extend to an indigent

defendants request for verbatim transcripts of trial proceedings. Moreover, an indigent
defendant's protections extend to every stage of a direct appeal and post conviction
actions.
However, these protections are not limitless and the State can provide
alternatives to verbatim transcripts.

Further, the State does not have to provide

transcripts of hearings or portions of hearings which are irrelevant to the issues raised
on appeal.

However, if the defendant establishes a "colorable need for a complete

transcript, the burden is on the State to show that only a portion of the transcript or an
9

'alternative' will suffice for an effective appeal on those grounds." Mayer, 404 U.S. at
195.

If this need has been established and state decides to deny a request for a

verbatim transcript, it is the State's burden to prove that there is an adequate alternative
or that the requested transcript is irrelevant.

2a.

The Court Erred In Denying Mr. Caldwell's Motion To Augment Because
He Made A Colorable Claim That The Transcripts And Documents Were
Relevant

The requested items are necessary for review of the district court's disposition of
Mr. Caldwell's I.C.R. 35 motion because the district court based his motion on
alternative grounds. (R., p.289.)

Specifically, the district court denied the I.C.R. 35

motion "because no new information was presented to the Court and the Court finds
Caldwell's sentence not unreasonable." (R., p.289.) It has been established that in
instances where "a lower court makes a ruling based on two alternative grounds and
only one of those grounds is challenged on appeal, the appellate court must affirm on
the uncontested basis. State v. Grazian, 144 Idaho 510, 517-18 (2007) (citing State v.
Goodwin, 131 Idaho 364, 366 (Ct. App. 1998).

Since the district court denied

Mr. Caldwell's Rule 35 motion, in part on the basis that no new information was
presented, in order to prevail on appeal, Mr. Caldwell must show that the information
presented was new and not before the district court at sentencing.

Therefore, the

information relied on by the district court at sentencing is directly relevant to its
disposition of Mr. Caldwell's I.C.R. 35 motion, which is now on appeal.
In addition, at the sentencing hearing, the district court expressly relied on the
requested items, and without those items, Mr. Caldwell is unable to establish that either
new information was presented or that his sentence is unreasonable. The district court
made the following statements at Mr. Caldwell's sentencing hearing:
10

I watched that same scenario with the co-defendant in this case. I can't
talk about everything that is in Virginia Reed's presentence investigation
report and I don't intend to, but I said this on the record in her sentencing
and it's clear to me she herself is a victim of sexual abuse as a child.
(09/28/10 Tr., p.54, Ls.17-23 (emphasis added)). While the district court stated it could
not repeat everything contained in Ms. Reed's PSI, it did not state it would limit its
consideration of everything continued in those materials.
The district court also noted that:
This case is somewhat can be differentiated from Virginia Reed's case in
a lot of ways. Number one, I recognize that there was no such thing as
sentence proportionality required in Idaho, at least not in these types of
cases. I think it is a factor that I have to consider. I think simple justice
does require that I at least examine what has happened to other
defendants in similar situations. But as I also said in the outset, I have to
sentence individuals differently.
There is a huge difference between, Mr. Caldwell, between you and
Virginia Reed. That huge difference is both credited to you, and for a lack
of a better way to put it, I guess. a minus to you. You are the type of
individual who is intelligent. You are well educated, you're well spoken.
You are the type of person who should know, for a lack of a better way to
put it, should have known better. I'm not saying that she shouldn't have
known better, but there are factors in her upbringing and that differentiates
your conduct from her conduct, and I think is one of the reasons for taking
a different, for this court treating you differently than her.
(09/28/10 Tr., p.66, L.11 - p.67, L.8 (emphasis added)).
I think that sentence is commensurate of that received by the codefendant in this case. It's actually more than that, but I intend it to be
more than that because I think your conduct is, frankly, more
reprehensible because of your position in society than hers. That's not the
criteria that I have to look at anyhow, but that's the decision I make.
(09/28/10 Tr., p.69, Ls.15-21 (emphasis added)).

Because the district court made

express references to Ms. Reed's presentence materials and her sentencing hearing,
stating it was going to consider that information when determining the length of
Mr. Caldwell's sentence, and also stating Ms. Reed's personal background was a factor
it had to consider when determining the length of Mr. Caldwell's sentence, without
11

access to Ms. Reed's presentence materials, Mr. Caldwell cannot challenge the district
court's characterization of Ms. Reed's background or Mr. Caldwell's culpability vis-a-vis
Ms. Reeds. Mr. Caldwell's inability to challenge the district court's factual findings at
sentencing is exacerbated by the fact the district court said it was going to use the
knowledge it gained from Ms. Reed's presentence materials, but was not going to
repeat the information on which it was relying at Mr. Caldwell's sentencing hearing. On
appeal, Mr. Caldwell and appellate counsel cannot challenge information the district
court used against Mr. Caldwell at sentencing without the requested items.
The district court also specifically referenced and relied on Mr. Caldwell's
testimony at trial when imposing sentencing, stating:
What I look at is this, this jury has convicted this defendant of seven
counts. He testified in this case. He absolutely denied any legal or
criminal culpability. The jury did not accept that. Frankly, Mr. Caldwell, I
will tell you, having heard the evidence in this case, if I had been the finder
of fact, I would have convicted you too. I think this verdict is supported by
the evidence and I confirm that verdict.
(09/28/10 Tr., p.59, Ls.14-22 (emphasis added)).
However, having said that, I also do take into consideration the fact that l
think you misrepresented and manipulated your testimony to this jury. I'm
not going to go so far as to say perjury. I think that's a very strong word,
but given the fact that you have acknowledged through the psychosexual
evaluation, the polygraph and so forth that you had sexual contact with
these children as described, balanced against what you said on the
witness stand under oath, it doesn't iive. Maybe that is part of the process
that one has to go through in terms of coming to terms with what you did,
but I do take into consideration and significantly take into consideration the
fact that I consider that you were less than candid with this jury when you
testified. I think that is an appropriate factor for me to consider in this
case.
(09/28/10 Tr., p.60, Ls.5-20 (emphasis added)). The district court said that Mr. Caldwell
absolutely denied any culpability when he testified at trial and then contradicted himself
during the psychosexual process.

Without access to the trial testimony, this factual
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finding used to aggravate sentencing cannot be challenged on appeal.

The district

court also said Mr. Caldwell manipulated his trial testimony. Again, that factual finding
cannot be challenged without access to Mr. Caldwell's trial testimony. The district court
carefully noted that this was viewed as an aggravating factor and was afforded
significant weight in its sentencing consideration. In order to challenge this aggravating
factor, and the reasonableness of his sentence, Mr. Caldwell needs access to the
transcript of his trial testimony.
The district court can consider the requested items when evaluating an I.C.R. 35
motion. The criteria for examining rulings denying requests for leniency pursuant to
I.C.R. 35 "are the same as those applied in determining whether the original sentence
was reasonable." State v. Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v.
Lopez, 106 Idaho 447, 450 (Ct. App. 1984)). Where a defendant contends that the

sentencing court imposed an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will
conduct an independent review of the record giving consideration to the nature of the
offense, the character of the offender, and the protection of the public interest. See
State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). "Where an appeal is taken from an

order refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 [the appellate court's] scope of
review includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the
subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." Arazia, 109 Idaho at 189, (citing
State v. Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984))(emphasis added). This is because

in order to determine whether new information is presented pursuant to Rule 35, the
reviewing court must first know what was presented at sentencing.

In reaching a

sentencing decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information
offered at the sentencing or disposition hearing. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize
13

knowledge gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136
Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); (see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900,907 (1983)
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon
what the court heard during the trial) (emphasis added); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 49
(Ct App. 1984) (approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the
preliminary hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could
be expected to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case." Id.
at 495) (emphasis added). Thus, the district court's disposition of an !.C.R. 35 motion
can be based on all of the information available to it at the sentencing hearing. The
information a district court can utilize at sentencing includes information it acquired at
hearings held prior to sentencing, such as a trial or a preliminary hearing.
Without the trial transcript, there is no way to establish if Mr. Caldwell provided
new and additional information in support of his !.C.R. 35 motion.

New or additional

information must be provided by a defendant in order for an Idaho appellate court to
review an appeal from an LC.R. 35 motion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201 (2007).
There is no way for an Idaho appellate court to determine whether the information
provided in support of Mr. Caldwell's I. C.R. 35 motion was new or additional, without a
transcript of testimony from the jury trial relied upon by the district court. For example,
the State referenced trial testimony characterizing Mr. Caldwell as an intelligent and
successful business owner. (09/28/10 Tr., p.26, Ls.11-18). This type of information is
considered by the Idaho Court of Appeals as a mitigating factor at sentencing. State v.
Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155 (Ct. App. 1996). Mr. Caldwell made reference to his business
in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

(R., pp.256-262.)

Absent access to the trial

transcript there is no way to determine whether this is new or additional information.
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2b.

The State Did Not Object To The Motion To Augment, And Therefore Did
Not Meet Its Burden To Prove The Transcripts Were Not Relevant On
Appeal

As noted in Section l(B)(2a) of this brief, if a defendant can make a colorable
argument thats/he needs a complete record on appeal, and the State wants to deny the
defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove the requested items are not
necessary for the appeal. Mayer, 404 U.S. at 195. Here, Mr. Caldwell established the
district court and the State made various representations at his sentencing hearing
which were based on the items he requested in his motion to augment.

The State did

not file an objection to Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment. Since the State did not object
to Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment, it could not have met its burden to prove the
requested items were not necessary for Mr. Caldwell to have an appeal on the merits.
2c.

If This Court Finds The Requested Items Are Irrelevant To The Court's
Determination At Sentencing And On The I.C.R. 35 Motion Then These
Items Should Be Stricken And The Case Remanded For A New
Sentencing And Rule 35 Hearing

"We must presume on appeal that a sentencing court is able to ascertain the
relevancy and reliability of the broad range of information and material which is
presented to it during the sentencing process, to disregard the irrelevant and unreliable
evidence, and to properly weigh the remaining evidence which may be in conflict.
Fodge v. State, 125 Idaho 882, 886 (Ct. App. 1994) (Citing to State v. Campbell, 123
Idaho 922, 926 (Ct. App.1993)). Implicit in the foregoing is that it is error for a district
court to consider irrelevant information at sentencing.
In the event this Court determines the requested

items are irrelevant,

Mr. Caldwell argues, in the alternative, that the district court erred when it considered
those documents in its sentencing decision, and in its disposition of his I.C.R. 35
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motion. In order to evaluate an I.C.R. 35 motion, the district court must reevaluate its
sentencing disposition.

If the district court erred at sentencing when considering

irrelevant information, that error is carried over in its disposition of Mr. Caldwell's I.C.R.
35 motion. This contention is amplified because the majority of aggravating evidence
used against Mr. Caldwell at sentencing was contained in the very documents the Idaho
Supreme Court denied Mr. Caldwell. See Section l(B)(2a).
2d.

To The Extent This Court Finds The Requested Items Relevant, It Cannot
Apply The Presumption That The Items Support The District Court's
Sentencing And I.C.R. 35 Decisions

The decision to deny Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment will make his appeal
meaningless because it will be presumed that the missing transcripts and exhibits
support the district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.

This functions as a

procedural bar to the review of Mr. Caldwell's appeal on the merits.
Since Mr. Caldwell was unable to provide an adequate record without the
requested items, the missing transcripts and documents will be presumed to support the
district court's order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion.

"It is well established that an

appellant bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate
court can review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the
record are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial
court." State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho
416,422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991); State v.
Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 (Ct.

App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, that
may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible,
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest[ed] that appellate counsel
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not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999).
In Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1963), a transcript was necessary to prefect an
appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the transcript. It was held a due
process and equal protection violation to preclude the defendant access to the said
transcript. Lane, 372 at 484-85.

Here, if Mr. Caldwell fails to provide the appellate

courts with the items he requested in his Motion to Augment, it will be presumed that
those items contain information which support the district court's denial of his I.C.R. 35
motion. Coma, 133 Idaho at 34. The denial of Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment has
made his appeal inherently unfair, because Idaho courts place the burden on him to
provide an adequate record on appeal and simultaneously prevented him from providing
the missing items. Such actions are a violation of due process. Lane, 372 at 484-85.
Therefore, if this Court deems the requested items or any portion of the requested items
are relevant to the issues raised in this appeal, the presumption articulated in Coma,
supra, should not be applied to those items.

In sum, there is a long line of opinions which repeatedly hold it is a violation of
both due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial
proceedings on appeal. The only constitutional limitation contained in this line of cases
is relevancy, and the State has failed to meet its burden of proving the requested
transcripts are not relevant to an issue raised on appeal. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision to deny Mr. Caldwell's Motion to Augment violated both the due
process clauses and the equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment of the
United States Constitution. Mr. Caldwell has no ability to challenge either the State's or
the district court's recollections of what occurred at trial and their characterization of
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Ms. Reed vis a vis Mr. Caldwell's culpability.

In the event mitigating evidence was

adduced at trial, there is no way for Mr. Caldwell to include or evaluate that information
on appeal.

Further, there is no record by which an appellate court can determine if

Mr. Caldwell provided new or additional information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.

3.

The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Caldwell With
Access To The Requested Transcripts And Exhibits Has Denied
Mr. Caldwell Due Process Because He Cannot Obtain Effective
Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal

In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process, the
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ...
[to J hold otherwise would . . . ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to,
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of
free government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72.
In Douglas

v.

California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court

relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny, and determined that the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent
defendant's the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the
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protection of Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on
appeal. According to the United State Supreme Court:
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel.
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397.
According to the United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a
conscientious examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments
to be made. Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967) held that the constitutional
requirements of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where
counsel acts as an active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as
advocate requires that he support his client's interest's to the best of his ability." See
also Banuelos v. State, 127 Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). Furthermore, in State v.
Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Card,
121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the starting point of evaluating whether counsel renders
effective assistance of counsel in a criminal action is the AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE DEFENSE FUNCTION.
insight into the role and responsibilities of appellate counsel.

These standards offer
Regarding appellate

counsel, the standards state:
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel,
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence .... Counsel should
advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance.
Standard 4-8.3(b). In this case, the lack of access to the requested items prevent
appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the case, and has
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potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is an additional
issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of, or contrary to, any
argument made. Counsel is also unable to advise Mr. Caldwell on the probable role the
items may play in the appeal. Since counsel was not able to review relevant portions of
the trial proceedings, Mr. Caldwell may not have received effective assistance of
counsel in his appeal.
Mr. Caldwell is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to all of the relevant
transcripts.

Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Caldwell his

constitutional right to due process, which includes a right to the effective assistance of
counsel in this appeal.

Accordingly, counsel should be provided with access to the

requested items and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any necessary
supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review.

11.
The District Court Erred When It Determined That Mr. Caldwell's Request For Counsel
In Regard To His Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous
A.

Introduction
Section 19-852(b)(3) of the Idaho Code enables indigent defendants to request

the appointment of counsel to assist them with an I.C.R. 35 motion. That code section
requires a district court to grant such a request unless the motion is frivolous.

In

determining whether a motion is frivolous, a defendant need only raise a colorable claim
which could be enhanced by the assistance of counsel. To meet this standard, indigent
defendants need not prove they will ultimately prevail on the merits of their I.C.R. 35
motion.
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Mr. Caldwell argues that in the context of an I.C.R. 35 motion, an indigent
defendant need only provide new or additional information in order to qualify for the
appointment of counsel pursuant to I.C. § 19-852(b )(3). Mr. Caldwell argues that he
provided both new and additional information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion and that
the district court erred when it concluded that his I.C.R. 35 motion was frivolous for
purposes of appointing counsel.
B.

The District Court Erred When It Determined That Mr. Caldwell's Request For
Counsel In Regard To His Idaho Criminal Rule 35 Motion Was Frivolous
Section 19-852{b)(3) of the Idaho Code, which governs the appointment of

counsel in I.C.R. 35 proceedings, requires a district court to appoint an indigent
defendant counsel, unless the district court finds that the request for appointment of
counsel is frivolous. LC. § 19-852(b){3). Whether an I.C.R. 35 motion is frivolous and
denial of counsel was proper is a question of law over which the appellate courts
exercise free review. State v. Wade, 125 Idaho 522, 525 {Ct. App. 1994).
A request for an appointment of counsel is frivolous if a reasonable person with
adequate means would not be willing to bring the motion at his/her own expense.
I.C. § 19-852(b)(3). A determination of whether the motion is frivolous is based upon
the contents of the motion itself and any accompanying documentation, and is
committed to the court's discretion. Wade, 125 Idaho at 525. If the request for counsel
has any colorable merit, it must be based on new or additional information. Id.
In the context of a post conviction proceeding, the Idaho Supreme Court has also
defined a frivolous claim:
In deciding whether the pro se petition raises the possibility of a valid
claim, the trial court should consider whether the facts alleged are such
that a reasonable person with adequate means would be willing to retain
counsel to conduct a further investigation into the claims. Although "the
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petitioner is not entitled to have counsel appointed in order to search the
record for possible nonfrivolous claims," Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676,
679, 23 P.3d 138, 141 (2001 ), the court should appoint counsel if the facts
alleged raise the possibility of a valid claim.
Swader

v.

State, 143 Idaho 651, 654 (2007).

1

The Idaho Supreme Court also

held:
When considering a motion for appointment of counsel, the trial court must
do more than determine whether the petition alleges a valid claim. The
court must also consider whether circumstances prevent the petitioner
from making a more thorough investigation into the facts. An indigent
defendant who is incarcerated in the penitentiary would almost certainly
be unable to conduct an investigation into facts not already contained in
the court record. Likewise, a pro se petitioner may be unable to present
sufficient facts showing that his or her counsel's performance was
deficient or that such deficiency prejudiced the defense. That showing will
often require the assistance of someone trained in the law. Therefore, the
trial court should appoint counsel if the petition alleges facts showing the
possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person with adequate
means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further investigation
into the claim. The investigation by counsel may not produce evidence
sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. But, the decision to appoint
counsel and the decision on the merits of the petition if counsel is
appointed are controlled by two different standards.
Id.

Additionally, the appointment of counsel inquiry must precede a determination of
the merits of the motion. Concerning that issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals stated as
follows:
[W]hen presented with a motion requesting appointed counsel to
represent a defendant on a Rule 35 motion, the court is required to
appoint an attorney unless the court finds that the motion is frivolous. That
finding must necessarily precede any ruling upon the merits of the
underlying complaint, motion or petition. Henderson, 123 Idaho at 53, 844
P.2d at 35. In the instant case, the district court impliedly found the Rule
35 motion to be frivolous and, therefore, refused to appoint an attorney to
1

Mr. Caldwell recognizes the appointment of counsel pursuant to an I.C.R 35 motion is
governed by I.C. § 19-852, while the appointment of post-conviction counsel is
governed by I.C. § 19-4904. The Idaho Court of Appeals has previously analogized the
frivolity standard contained in LC. § 19-852, in the context of post conviction
proceedings. Swisher v. State, 129 Idaho 467, 468-69 (Ct. App. 1996).
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represent Wade. However, the court improperly entered the finding after
having already ruled upon the merits of Wade's Rule 35 motion. The
improper sequence of these rulings would ordinarily be reversible error
requiring that we vacate the orders and remand for the district court to
consider anew the request for counsel and the Rule 35 motion.
Wade, 125 Idaho at 525 (emphasis added).
In this case, the district court denied Mr. Caldwell's request for counsel on the
grounds that Mr. Caldwell "has not provided any new material of any consequence. The
fact that Caldwell's incarceration would have financial impact on his family was
addressed during the sentencing hearing. The Court finds that a reasonable person
would not be willing to bring this motion at their expense and therefore finds
[Mr.] Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion frivolous." (R, p.287.)
Mr. Caldwell's request for counsel was not frivolous because the district court
didn't recognize the new and additional information he provided in support of his I.C.R.
35 motion.

The district court accurately stated that Mr. Caldwell's financial hardship

was before it at sentencing. However, Mr. Caldwell also provided additional information
pertaining to the financial hardship his family was facing due to his incarceration.
Specifically, Mr. Caldwell's wife started teaching piano lessons and teaching in a school
to help support their six children. (R, p.256.) At the time of sentencing, Ms. Caldwell
was a full-time housewife. (PSI, p.64; R., p.264.) 2 As a result, Mr. Caldwell's children
are being negativity impacted because they only have one parent who is currently
working two jobs. (R, p.257.) According to Mr. Caldwell:
My children are really feeling the effects of [their] mother working two jobs
and being out of the home. This is very hard on all of them [,] they are 17,
15, 12, 9, 6, and my 20 yr old is currently trying to afford to stay in college
at Southern Utah University. My wife and I have always felt that it is very
2

The PSI contains various attachments. For ease of citation, the PSI and its
attachments have been numbered beginning with the cover page of the PSI and ends
on page 70.
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important for her to be at home with the children and give them the help,
encouragement[,J and love that they need. My children are frustrated and
upset because they have lost that security .... My wife works long hours
and has little to no time to spend with them except to meet [theirJ basic
needs. [TheirJ school grades are suffering and on the decline ...
(R., p.256.) Mr. Caldwell's construction company was hit hard because he is not able to
fully manage its affairs, and because of the loss of work due to the recession.

(R.,

p.256.) Mr. Caldwell also indicated that although he is attempting to find employment
while incarcerated so he could provide his family some financial support, it is difficult
due to overcrowding.

(R., p.258.)

Mr. Caldwell also stated that the length of his

sentences foreclose the possibility that he could find employment at a work center,
further limiting his ability to support his family. (R., p.258.)
Mr. Caldwell provided new information pertaining to the conditions of his
confinement. It was noted in Huffman, supra, that "conduct while incarcerated or any
unusual risks faced by a particular defendant while incarcerated may be properly
considered." Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203 n.1. Mr. Caldwell stated he was transferred
into a new facility which reduces the number of Alcoholics Anonymous meeting he can
attend, and has less access to treatment generally. (R., p.259.) In addition, prison
facility has more enclosed spaces which are exacerbating Mr. Caldwell's anxiety and
depression.

(R., p.261.)

Mr. Caldwell provided new information indicating that his

confinement is having a negative impact on his mental health and rehabilitation.
The district court should have informed Mr. Caldwell about the perceived
deficiency contained in his I.C.R. 35 motion and allowed him the opportunity to file an
addendum with the requisite information.

When a pro se inmate files a post conviction

petition which contains insufficient facts to state a claim, "the petitioner should therefore
be advised of the deficiencies in the petition and given an opportunity to allege
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additional facts before the court denies the request for appointment of counsel."
Swader, 143 Idaho at 653-54 (citing to Brown v. State, 135 Idaho 676 (2001)). While

this case is not a post conviction case, there is no reason the rationale would not apply
to an inmate filing a pro se I.C.R. 35 motion. Under both circumstances, an inmate's
lack of legal sophistication could be the only reason why their otherwise meritorious
claims were denied for procedural reasons. It is inconsistent to afford added protections
to an inmate filing a post-conviction petition, but deny those same protections to an
inmate filing an I.C.R. 35 motion. After determining that Mr. Caldwell's LC.R. 35 motion
did not contain any new or additional information, the district court should have informed
Mr. Caldwell of this deficiency and provided him with an opportunity to submit an
addendum to his I.C.R. 35 motion.
In sum, Mr. Caldwell's I.C.R. 35 motion was not frivolous because it was
supported by new and additional information.

Had counsel been appointed,

Mr. Caldwell would have been able to further develop this information or to determine
other meritorious information that would support his I.C.R. 35 motion. The foregoing
substantiates the contention that the district court abused its discretion when it failed to
appoint Mr. Caldwell counsel to represent him on his I.C.R. 35 motion.

111.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Caldwell's Rule 35 Motion
For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The Financial And Emotional Hardships
Caused By His Sentence And The Negative Impact His Sentence Is Having On His
Mental Health
A.

Introduction
The district court concluded that Mr. Caldwell did not provide any new

information in support of his LC.R. 35 motion, because the district court was aware

25

Mr. Caldwell's sentence would negatively impact his family's finances at the time of
sentencing.

However, as argued in the previous section, Mr. Caldwell provided

additional information detailing the extent of the financial and emotional hardship his
sentence was causing.

In addition, he provided new information about the negative

impacts his sentence is having on his mental health. When this information is taken into
consideration with the information before the district court at sentencing, it supports the
conclusion that Mr. Caldwell's sentence is unduly harsh.
B.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Caldwell's Rule 35
Motion For A Reduction Of Sentence In Light Of The Financial And Emotional
Hardships Caused By His Sentence And The Negative Impact His Sentence Is
Having On His Mental Health
A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under I.C.R. 35 is addressed to

the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency which
may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. Trent,
125 Idaho 251,253 (Ct. App. 1994) (citing State v. Forde, 113 Idaho 21 (Ct. App. 1987),
and State v. Lopez, 106 Idaho 447 (Ct. App. 1984)).

"When presenting a Rule 35

motion, the defendant must show that the sentence is excessive in light of new or
additional information subsequently provided to the district court in support of the Rule
35 motion." Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203. ''The criteria for examining rulings denying the
requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the original
sentence was reasonable." Trent, 125 Idaho at 253 (citing Lopez, 106 Idaho at 450).
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982).
26

The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, '"[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits,
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Caldwell does not allege his sentence

exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of discretion,
Mr. Caldwell must show that in light of the governing criteria, the sentence was
excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. (citing State v. Broadhead, 120 Idaho
141, 145 (1991), overruled on other grounds by State v. Brown, 121 Idaho 385 (1992)).
The governing criteria or objectives of criminal punishment are:

(1) protection of

society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. (quoting State v.
Wolfe, 99 Idaho 382, 384 (1978)) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Coassolo, 136

Idaho 138 (2001 )).
"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under
Rule 35, [the Appellate Court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to
reduce."

State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 (Ct. App. 1985) (citing to State v.

Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984)). In reaching a sentencing decision, a district

court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the sentencing or
disposition hearing. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge gained from its own
official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 367, 373-74 (Ct. App.
2001 ); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 ( 1983) (recognizing that the findings
of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon what the court heard during the
trial) (emphasis added);

State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 49 (Ct. App. 1984) (approving
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sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary hearing from a
previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected to disregard
what he already knew about Gibson from the other case." Id. at 495) (emphasis added).
Mr. Caldwell provided new information in support of his I.C.R. 35 motion.
Mr. Caldwell provided new information indicating that his conditions of confinement
were inhibiting both his mental health rehabilitation, as well as his substance addiction
rehabilitation. (R., pp.259, 261.) Mr. Caldwell's mental health and substance addition
are both mitigating factors. In State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 569-70 (2008), the Idaho
Supreme Court held that even in instances where there is no nexus between a crime
and the mental health issue(s), mental health evidence is relevant to sentence
mitigation. Implicit in the foregoing is that the mitigating nature of mental health issues
should be amplified when there is a nexus between the underlying offense, the
defendant's mental health problems. Additionally, in State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89 (1982),
it was held that substance addiction is a mitigating factor.
Here, there is a nexus between Mr. Caldwell's mental health, substance
addiction, and the commission of the underlying offense.

Mr. Caldwell has a long

mental health history. Mr. Caldwell was adopted when he was nine months old. (PSI,
p.6.)

Mr. Caldwell said he had a lot of "garbage in his head" and would cut himself

when he was between the ages of eight to ten years old.

(PSI, p.31.)

When

Mr. Caldwell was a "kid" he "took a 22 rifle and put it in his mouth. He pulled the trigger,
however, the gun did not go off .... " (PSI, p.31.) When Mr. Caldwell was in college he
had a job as a wrecker and was called on a job where two of his baseball teammates
were killed in a head on collision. (PSI, p.30.) Mr. Caldwell arrived at the scene of the
accident and attempted to revive his dying friends. (PSI, p.30.)
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Mr. Caldwell has

suffered from nightmares where he could feel his friend's blood was on his hands and
he kept telling them to hold on until help arrives. (PSI, p.36.) Mr. Caldwell suffers from
posttraumatic stress disorder (hereinafter "PTSD"), which was caused by this event.
(PSI, p.30.)
attacks.

In addition, Mr. Caldwell suffers from depression and serious anxiety

(PSI, p.62.)

Mr. Caldwell also has a history of substance addiction.

Mr. Caldwell began drinking alcohol as a teenager and developed a drinking problem
since that time. (PSI, p.5.) Dr. Atkins, a licensed clinical psychologist, articulated the
connection between Mr. Caldwell's mental health, substance addiction, and his offenses
as follows:
Richard Caldwell has been in therapy with me since October 2009. At that
time he had recently been arrested for the lewd and lascivious charges he
has been convicted of. At that time it quickly became obvious that Rick
suffered from severe Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and a very
significant substance abuse problem. Since first being involved with Rick,
he has been compliant with treatment requirements. He has completed a
substance abuse program, maintained sobriety, begun work on repairing
relationships and worked diligently on his PTSD issues and symptoms.
Rick has made significant progress on all fronts. Unfortunately, his PTSD
went undiagnosed and untreated for a long time. His substance abuse
was an effort to "self-medicate" the symptoms, as is common with the
disorder. The combination of substance abuse and PTSD have often
tragic results, as is evidenced in Rick's case. The above are not excuses
for his behavior, but they are reasons. It is my opinion that if he had
received treatment at an earlier time the current situation could have been
avoided completely.
I also believe, given continued sobriety and
treatment, Rick presents little to no risk for recidivism.
(PSI, p.39.) According to the PSI, Mr. Caldwell was primarily under the influence of
alcohol when he committed the underlying offenses. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Caldwell's mental
health issues fueled his substance addiction, which was directly connected with his
commission of the underlying offense.

Dr. Atkins stated if his PTSD had been

diagnosed earlier, he would not have committed his offense. Dr. Atkins also stated that
Mr. Caldwell is amenable to treatment and possesses little to no risk to reoffend.
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Therefore, Mr. Caldwell is amenable to rehabilitation and poses little to no risk to
society.
Additionally, Mr. Caldwell's amenability for rehabilitation is further evidenced by
the outpatient recommendations he received from various treatment providers and
participation in treatment. According to his psychosexual evaluation, Mr. Caldwell was
deemed a moderate risk to reoffend and he was deemed appropriate for outpatient
treatment in a highly structured treatment environment.

(PSI, p.54.)

According to

Dr. Potts, a licensed psychologist, Mr. Caldwell graduated from the Dayspring
Outpatient Substance Abuse Program. (PSI, p.40.) In addition, Mr. Caldwell attended
over 80 community 12-step meetings, maintained regular contact with his sponsor, and
regularly attended their aftercare program.

(PSI. p.40.)

Dr. Potts also stated that

Mr. Caldwell "is very committed to maintaining recovery. He has additionally attended
individual counseling that has significantly helped decrease his depression and anxiety.
This recovery process has completely changed his life." (PSI, p.40.) The PSI noted
that Mr. Caldwell was co-chairing a men's Alcoholics Anonymous group. (PSI, p.12.)
Mr. Caldwell's mental health and substance addiction were significant factors at
the time of his sentencing. The new information he provided in support of his I.C.R. 35
motion indicated that his sentence was not promoting his rehabilitation.

Therefore,

Mr. Caldwell's sentence is harsh in light of that new information.
The remaining new information, which was provided by Mr. Caldwell in support of
his I.C.R. 35 motion, was listed in Section ll(B) of this brief and will not be repeated
here.
There are additional mitigating factors present at sentencing which, when viewed
in light of Mr. Caldwell's new information, support a reduction of his sentence.
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Specifically, Mr. Caldwell has displayed remorse and acceptance of responsibility. The
issue of reducing a sentence because a defendant expresses remorse has been
addressed in several cases. For example, in State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204 (Ct. App.
1991 ), the Idaho Court of Appeals noted that some leniency is required when the
defendant has expressed "remorse for his conduct, his recognition of his problem, his
willingness to accept treatment and other positive attributes of his character." Id. at 209;
see also State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982) (reducing sentence of first time
offender who accepted responsibility for his acts and had the support of his family in his
rehabilitation efforts); see also State v. Carrasco, 114 Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App.
1988), reversed on other grounds, State v. Carrasco, 117 Idaho 295 (1990) (reducing
sentence of first time offender who accepted responsibility, expressed remorse, and had
been of good character before the offense at issue)). Mr. Caldwell made the following
statements at sentencing:
I'm sorry [K.M.] I know I can't go back and fix the things that have
happened, but I apologize. I hope that you can go on and live a
successful life, as well as you M.M.
(Tr., p.49, Ls.13-16.) Mr. Caldwell went on to state:
I know there is a price to pay and I am willing to pay that price. I've been
through an intense alcohol rehabilitation through Day Spring lntermountain
Health Care. They have slowly helped me come to terms. It's been very
hard and taken a long time for me to admit to myself how much damage I
have caused. Through working the steps, I've truly been humbled.
I have a great sponsor Cory who has been with me every day, who calls
me, sees me at meetings, who has encouraged me to push beyond the
envelope of my comfortableness. He moved me to step eight, which is
where I admit and be willing to make amends for the mistakes and the
problems and the damage that I have caused. I've worked on that with
him every day in August, and most of the month of September. I've made
a list of the people that I've damaged and caused grief to because of my
bad choices which I am willing to take reasonability for. It's a great
program. I never realized how much it would change my life.
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(Tr., p.50, Ls.3-23.) Mr. Caldwell took "full and complete responsibility for his actions in
this case and does not seek to assign any blame or responsibility to his victims." (R.,
p.218.) Mr. Caldwell's acceptance of reasonability it a critical step in the process of
rehabilitation and, for the reason, should be considered as a mitigating factor.

See

State v. Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,817 (Ct. App. 2010).
Mr. Caldwell has family support. In State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 594 (1982),
the Idaho Supreme Court noted that support of family and friends were mitigating
factors. Here, Mr. Caldwell received numerous support letters from his parents, wife,
daughter, sisters, Alcoholics Anonymous sponsor, and the Mayor of Payson City, Rick
Moore. (PSI, pp.62-70.) All of these letters state that his friends and family will support
him, despite his current legal situation.
Additionally, Mr. Caldwell has a positive employment background, which is a
mitigating factor.

In State v. Hagedorn, 129 Idaho 155, 161 (Ct. App. 1996), it was

deemed appropriate to consider a defendant's employment background as a mitigating
factor.

Here, Mr. Caldwell graduated from high school and attended Utah Valley

Community College. (PSI, p.8.) Mr. Caldwell then transferred to Utah State University,
but left to complete a religious mission for his church.

(PSI, p.8.) While in college,

Mr. Caldwell studied in a premedical program, but transferred into a construction
management program. (PSI, p.32.) Mr. Caldwell became a carpenter and owned and
operated his own construction business for fifteen years. (PSI, p.10.) During this period
of time, Mr. Caldwell was successful and fully capable of providing for his stay-at-home
wife and their six children.

(R., p.221; PSI, p.64.)

Even the State recognized

Mr. Caldwell was successful in operating a complicated business, which was very
stressful. (Tr., p.25, L.16 - p.26, L.18.) Mr. Caldwell's ability to succeed in business
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provides him with a financial incentive to avoid any future criminal conduct. Therefore,
Mr. Caldwell's positive educational and employment background should both be
considered as mitigating factors.
Mr. Caldwell's abusive childhood is also a mitigating factor.

This Court has

recognized exposure to abuse during a defendant's childhood as a mitigating factor.
State v. Williams, 135 Idaho 618, 620 (Ct. App. 2001 ). When Mr. Caldwell was four

years old, he and his younger brother were both the victims of sexual abuse perpetrated
by a babysitter who was sixteen or seventeen years old. (PSI, p.12.) Mr. Caldwell also
prevented his younger brother from becoming a victim by the same babysitter. (PSI,
pp.12, 32.) Despite the abuse he suffered, this was not a violent offense, which is also
a mitigating factor. (See State v. Brandt, 109 Idaho 728, 729 (Ct. App. 1985) (district
court's decision to consider the non-violent nature of an offense a mitigating factor was
appropriate)).
Further, Mr. Caldwell's suffered from a heart attack at the age of 31, which
should be considered as a mitigating factor.

This Court has recognized that a

defendant's health problems can properly be considered by a court at sentencing. State
v. Cobell, 148 Idaho 349, 356 (Ct. App. 2009).

Finally, Mr. Caldwell's good character is relevant to mitigation. Evidence of a
defendant's good or bad character is relevant in a court's sentencing decision. State v.
Weise, 75 Idaho 404, 411 (1954).

Mr. Caldwell's parents wrote that he "has many

construction skills and mechanical talents that he selflessly uses in providing meaningful
assistance to others. He is well known as one who puts forth special efforts to be of
help to other people." (PSI, p.62.) Mr. Caldwell is an eagle scout, volunteered as a
scout master, and five of his scouts earned their eagle scout award.
33

(PSI, p.64.)

Mr. Caldwell is compassionate and helps homeless people whenever possible. (PSI,
p.65.) He also "served an honorable mission for the Church of Jesus Christ of Latterday Saints." (PSI, p.66.) Mr. Caldwell "has always exhibited characteristics of a good
father, and he and his wife have raised great children.

He has always responded

positively to requests for help when [his family] needed it." (PSI, p.66.) Mr. Caldwell
"has always had a kind heart. He would give anyone the shirt off his back it that were
his only possession." (PSI, p.67.) Mr. Caldwell's good character is a mitigating factor.
In sum, Mr. Caldwell provided new information in support of his I.C.R 35 motion.
When this information is considered with the information before the district court at
sentencing, it supports the conclusion that his sentence is unduly harsh.
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CONCLUSION
Counsel respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and exhibits
and requests the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising
issues which arise as a result of that review. If it is determined that the requested items
are irrelevant, Mr. Caldwell requests that this case is remanded with instructions for the
district court to review his I.C.R. 35 motion without any consideration of the irrelevant
information adduced at sentencing, which is contained in the requested items.
Additionally, Mr. Caldwell respectfully requests this Court reverse the district court's
order denying his I.C.R. 35 motion and remand with instructions to appoint counsel to
represent him on his I.C.R. 35 motion. Alternatively, Mr. Caldwell respectfully requests
that the fixed portion of his sentence be reduced from three years to two years.
Alternatively, Mr. Caldwell respectfully requests this Court place him on probation and
remand to the district court with instructions to impose terms of probation it deems
appropriate.
DATED this '~day of November, 2011.
""'
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